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ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
41-6-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Alley" means a street or highway intended to provide access to the
rear or side of lots or buildings in urban districts and not intended for
through vehicular traffic.
(2) "All-terrain type I vehicle" is used as defined in Section 41-22-2.
(3) "Authorized emergency vehicle" means fire department vehicles,
police vehicles, ambulances, and other publicly or privately owned vehicles as designated by the commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety.
(4) "Bicycle" means every device propelled by human power upon
which any person may ride, having two tandem wheels, except scooters
and similar devices.
(5) "Bus" means every motor vehicle designed for carrying more than
15 passengers and used for the transportation of persons; and every motor
vehicle, other than a taxicab, designed and used for the transportation of
persons for compensation.
(6) "Controlled-access highway" means every highway, street, or roadway to or from which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other
persons have no legal right of access, except at points as determined by
the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway, street, or roadway.
(7) "Crosswalk" means:
(a) that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the
connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of
the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs,
from the edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a
sidewalk on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway included
within the extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk at
right angles to the centerline; or
(b) any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings
on the surface.
(8) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.
(9) "Divided highway" means a highway divided into two or more roadways by unpaved intervening space or by a physical barrier or by a
clearly indicated dividing section constructed to impede vehicular traffic.
(10) "Explosives" means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion
and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in proportions, quantities, or packing so that an ignition by fire,
friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound
or mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases, and the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects
on contiguous objects or of causing death or serious bodily injury.
385

41-6-1

MOTOR VEHICLES

(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement, for drawing plows, mowing machines, and
other implements of husbandry.
(12) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flashpoint of
100 degrees F. or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closedcup test device.
(13) "Gross weight" means the weight of a vehicle without load plus
the weight of any load on the vehicle.
(14) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the
public as a matter of right for vehicular travel.
(15) "Intersection" means the area embraced within the prolongation
or connection of the lateral curblines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two or more highways whichjoin one another.
Where a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, every
crossing of each roadway of the divided highway by an intersecting highway is a separate intersection; if the intersecting highway also includes
two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of two roadways
of the highways is a separate intersection.
The junction of an alley with a street or highway is not an intersection.
(16) "Local authorities" means every county, municipal, and other local
board or body having authority to enact laws relating to traffic under the
constitution and laws of the state.
(17) "Metal tire" means a tire, the surface of which in contact with the
highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient material.
(18) "Mobile home" means:
(a) a trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed, and
equipped as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place either
permanently or temporarily, and is equipped for use as a conveyance
on streets and highways; or
(b) a trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is
designed and constructed for use as a mobile home, as defined in
Subsection (a), but which is instead used permanently or temporarily
for the advertising, sales, display, or promotion of merchandise or
services, or for any other commercial purpose except the transportation of property for hire or the transportation of property for distribution by a private carrier.
(19) "Moped" means a motor-driven cycle having both pedals to permit
propulsion by human power, and a motor which produces not more than
two brake horsepower and which is not capable of propelling the cycle at a
speed in excess of 30 miles per hour on level ground. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement may not exceed 50 cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions
directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator
after the drive system is engaged.
(20) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by
human power and motorized wheel chairs.
(21) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not
more than three wheels in contact with the ground.

386

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-1

(22) "Motor-driven cycle" means every motorcycle and motor scooter,
and every motorized bicycle having an engine with less than 150 cubic
centimeters displacement or having a motor which produces not more
than five horsepower.
(23) "Official traffic-control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of
regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.
(24) "Off-highway implement of husbandry" is used as defined under
Section 41-22-2.
(25) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2.
(26) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
(27) "Park" or "parking" means the standing of a vehicle, whether
occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers.
(28) "Peace officer" means every law enforcement officer authorized
under Section 77-la-1 to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for
violations of traffic laws.
(29) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot.
(30) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.
(31) "Pole trailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed
to be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by
means of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the
towing vehicle, and is ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular
shaped loads such as poles, pipes, or structural members generally capable of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connections.
(32) "Private road or driveway" means every way or place in private
ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having
express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons.
(33) "Railroad" means a carrier of persons or property upon cars operated upon stationary rails.
(34) "Railroad sign or signal" means a sign, signal, or device erected by
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad
train.
(35) "Railroad train" means a locomotive propelled by any form of energy, coupled with or operated without cars, and operated upon rails.
(36) "Right-of-way" means the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to
proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian
approaching under circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity
which give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the
other.
(37) "Roadway" means that portion of highway improved, designed, or
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or
other human-powered vehicles. If a highway includes two or more separate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway separately but not to all
roadways collectively.
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(38) "Safety zone" means the area or space officially set apart within a
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected,
marked, or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all
times while set apart as a safety zone.
(39) "School bus" means every motor vehicle that complies with the
color and identification requirements of the most recent edition of "Mini•
mum Standards for School Buses" and is used to transport school children
to or from school or school activities. This definition does not include
vehicles operated by common carriers in transportation of school children
to or from school or school activities.
(40) "Semitrailer" means a vehicle with or without motive power, other
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle, and constructed so that some part ofits
weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.
(41) "Shoulder area" means that area of the hard-surfaced highway
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge line as established in the
current approved "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that
portion of the road contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral support.
(42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between the curb lines,
or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended
for the use of pedestrians.
(43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of rubber or other resilient
material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of
the load.
(44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting of a vehicle, whether
occupied or not, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while
actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.
(45) "Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement.
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited means any halting even momentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to
avoid conflict with other traffic or when in compliance with the directions
of a peace officer or official traffic-control device.
(4 7) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles,
and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway
for the purpose of travel.
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device, whether manually, electrically, or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed
to stop and permitted to proceed.
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or without motive power, other
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed so that no part of its
weight rests upon the towing vehicle.
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained
primarily for the transportation of property.
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck tractor.
(52) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including
any street, in which structures devoted to business, industry, or dwelling
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houses are situated at intervals of less than 100 feet, for a distance of a
quarter of a mile or more.
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-1, enacted by L.
1979,ch.242,§
1; 1986,ch.36,§
1;1987,ch.
138, § 1; 1987, ch. 162, § 25.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979,
ch. 242, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-1 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 57-7-78; L. 1949, ch.
65, § 1; 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 5), relating to
definitions, and enacted present section 41-6-1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, alphabetized and renumbered the definitions in this section accordingly; in Subsection (3) substituted "except
scooters and similar devices" for "either of
which is more than 12 inches in diameter" at
the end; in Subsection (4) substituted "15 passengers" for "ten passengers"; in Subsection (8)
substituted "by unpaved intervening space" for
"by leaving an intervening space"; in Subsection (9) substituted "causing death or serious
bodily injury" for "destroying life or limb" at
the end; in Subsection (13) substituted the
present provisions for "Highway means the entire width between the boundary lines of every
way publicly maintained when any part of it is
open to the use of the public for purposes of
vehicular travel"; in Subsection (14) substituted "roadways of two or more highways" for
"roadways of two highways" and omitted from
the ·end "at, or approximately at, right angles,
or the area within which vehicles traveling
upon different highways joining at any other
angle come in conflict"; in Subsection (17) substituted "Mobile home" for "House-trailer" in
both places it appears; in Subsection (b) substituted "Subsection (17)" for "Subsection (18)";
inserted the present Subsection (18); in Subsection (19) added at the end "except vehicles
moved solely by human power and motorized
wheel chairs"; in Subsection (20) added at the
end "in contact with the ground"; in Subsection

(21) substituted the present provisions for "motor-driven cycle means every motorcycle, including every motor scooter, with a motor
which produces not to exceed five horsepower,
and every bicycle with motor attached"; in
Subsection (23) substituted "Operator" for
"Driver"; in Subsection (25) substituted "Peace
officer" for "Police officer" and substituted "law
enforcement officer authorized under Section
77-la-1" for "officer authorized"; in Subsection
(32) substituted the pr.isent provisions for
"railroad train means a steam engine, electric
or other motor, with or without cars coupled to
it operated upon rails"; in Subsection (34) at
the end of the first sentence substituted the
present provisions for "exclusive of the berm,
or shoulder"; in Subsection (36) substituted the
present provisions for the former provisions of
Subsection (41) of this section as last amended
by Laws 1986, ch. 36, § 1; in Subsection (43)
substituted "a peace officer or official trafficcontrol device" for "a police officer or trafficcontrol sign or signal"; deleted the provisions
of the former Subsections (2), (6), (20), (37),
(46), (50), and (51) as last amended by Laws
1986, ch. 36, § 1; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 162, inserted present Subsections (2), (28) and (29)
and redesignated the subsequent subsections
accordingly.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References.
Disabled persons,
parking privileges, § 41-1-49.9.
Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30.
Words and phrases defined by statute, construction of, § 68-3-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ambulance service.
Construction and application.
Crosswalks.
Intersection.
Right-of-way statutes.
Roadways.
Vehicle.
-Horse.
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Ambulance service.
Ambulance operated by service registered
with public service commission, and involved
in accident while making emergency run was
"authorized emergency vehicle" within meaning of statute and was in privileged status with
respect to speed limits and traffic signals despite contentions that ambulance driver was
negligent as matter of law for exceeding speed
limit and ignoring traffic signals, that ambulance service was not "public service corporation" within the meaning of law, and that ambulance service was not authorized by "local
authority." Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269,
421 P.2d 159 (1966).
Construction and application.
This title pertains preponderantly to motor
vehicles not confined to tracks viz.: automobiles and motorcycles and the like. It is a Uniform Act designed to regulate nonrail vehicular traffic on streets, and, therefore, expressly
excludes steam trains, trolley and interurban
cars. Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah 265,
153 P.2d 541 (1944), discussing repeal of former laws and holding that the power to require
interurban trains to stop at through streets
was, by the legislature, granted to cities entirely independent of Title 41, U. C. A. 1953,
and referring to Title 10, which contains most
of the power granted by the legislature to cities
and towns.
Prior to 1949 amendment, this section excluded from the operation of this act "vehicles
used exclusively upon stationary rails and
tracks." Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah
265, 153 P.2d 541 (1944). See present Subsection (53), defining "vehicle".
Crosswalks.
Even though many people may cross a street
at a certain place, a crosswalk is not created
since use, by itself, does not establish a rightof-way for pedestrians. Langlois v. Rees, 10
Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960).
The statutory definition implied that there
was an unmarked crosswalk only if a street's
sidewalk (or the edge of the traversable roadway) was intersected and continued on and if a
pedestrian way terminated at an intersection,
it terminated without crossing the street unless it continued as a marked crosswalk.
Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 638
(1960).

Intersection.
Jury was properly instructed that site of collision was "intersection" under statute prohibiting passing another vehicle without 100 feet
of intersection in light of evidence that crossing road intersected main highway from both
east and west and crossed it at right angles,
that main highway was widened for about 1/10
of a mile in both directions to provide extra
lane for acceleration and deceleration in entering or leaving highway and that there were
stop signs at both east and west side to warn
oncoming traffic; result was not changed by
fact that the crossing road was only infrequently traveled dirt road and not readily observable to main highway traveler. Hathaway
v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850 (1968).
Right-of-way statutes.
The right-of-way statutes are designed to
prevent an accident by two persons both otherwise lawfully on the roadway reaching the
same place at the same time. The right-of-way
is not absolute for either pedestrian or motorist, but both have a continuing duty at all
times to use reasonable care for the safety of
others, even when one has the right-of-way
over the other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d
272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960).
Roadways.
Not every driveway between a sidewalk and
a street falls within definition of roadway; pedestrian who was walking along edge of driveway and was out of regular course of travel was
not contributorily negligent as a matter of law
as to motorist who backed from garage and
struck her. Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5,336
P.2d 781 (1959).
Vehicle.
-Horse.
The defendant's conviction of operating avehicle under the influence of alcohol denied him
due process of law because the statute under
which he was convicted (§ 41-6-44) did not give
him adequate notice that being intoxicated
while riding a horse was a crime. The definition of "vehicle" in this section cannot be legitimately read to include horses. State v.
Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1 to 8,
16.
A.L.R- - Street corner or intersection, park-

ing illegally at or near, as affecting liability for
motor vehicle accident, 4 A.L.R.3d 324.
What is street or highway intersection
within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor vehicle"
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or the like within statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process on
nonresident motorist, 36 A.L.R.3d 1387.
"Vehicle" or "land vehicle" within meaning
of insurance policy provisions defining risks
covered or excepted, 65 A.L.R.3d 824.

41-6-1.5. Private vehicle

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused
by defective tire, 81 A.L.R.3d 318.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles
1 to 3, 6.

=

as emergency

vehicle -

Rules.

The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety may make rules,
consistent with this chapter, governing the use, in emergencies, of signal
lights on privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a rule allowing
privately-owned vehicles to be designated for part-time emergency use.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-1.5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 271, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection designation from

41-6-2 to 41-6-10.

former Subsection (1), deleted Subsections (2)
through (6) as enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 271,
§ 1, and made minor changes in phraseology
and punctuation in the present material.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 41-6-2 to 41-6-10 (L.
1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, ch.
78,§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, §§ 1 to

8), relating to definitions of terms for traffic
regulation provisions, were repealed by Laws
1979, ch. 242, § 74.

ARTICLE 2
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC
REGULATIONS
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on highwaystions.

Excep-

The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer
exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways, except:
(1) where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section;
or
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 and Sections 41-6-29 to
41-6-45 inclusive, which apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout
the state.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 2; C. 1943,
57-7-79;L. 1978, ch. 33, § 2; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment in Subsection (2) inserted "Section
41-6-13.5" following "provisions of' and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2, 11 et seq.,
204 et seq.

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 1 to 8,
16.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles
1 to 3, 6.
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Violation of chapter - Class B misdemeanor, unless specified.

A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class B misdemeanor, unless
otherwise provided.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943,
57-7-80; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 3; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 4.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment rewrote the section.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Purpose of Motor Vehicle Code.
The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to
govern the safety of the use and operation of
motor vehicles, and one who violates provisions of this act is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his violation; one such pro-

vision is the legislative determination that
.10% of alcohol in blood content makes it dangerous for a person to operate a vehicle,
§ 41-6-44.2. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 204.

41-6-13.

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e,, 6.

Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers.

(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways."
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943,
57-7-81; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment designated the existing paragraph as
Subsection (1), substituted "peace officer, fire-

man, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school
crossing guard" for "police officer'' and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation; and added Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Obedience to traffic officer.
Cited.
Obedience to traffic officer.
Pedestrian was denied recovery for injuries
sustained when she was struck by overhang of
motorbus where from the evidence it appeared
that when she was half-way across the street

the traffic light changed against her and she
stopped in the safety zone, giving the other
traffic the right-of-way, and that the overhang
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner
in response to traffic officer's express direction.
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Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939).

41-6-14

Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d
981 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 19.

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles P 10.

41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop Fleeing - Traveling at excessive speeds or causing property damage or bodily injury - Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing: (a) travels
in excess of 30 miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage
to the property of another or bodily injury to another; or (c) leaves the state, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L.
1978,ch. 33, § 38; L. 1981, ch. 269, § 1; 1987,
ch. 138, § 6.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace officer" for "police officer" near the beginning of
the subsection and near the end substituted "a
peace office by vehicle or other means is" for
"the police shall be"; in Subsection (2) designated the previously undesignated clauses and

in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "30 miles per
hour above the posted speed limit" for "90
miles per hour"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

41-6-14. Emergency vehicles - Applicability of traffic law
to highway work vehicles - Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger
life or property; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning
in specified directions.
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is
visible from in front of the vehicle.
393
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(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges.
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or
from the work.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1965,
ch. 83, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 4; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 7.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1955,
ch. 71, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-14 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 5; C. 1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch.
65, § 1), relating to applicability and exemptions from act of certain drivers, and enacted
present section 41-6-14.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operator" for "driver"
throughout the section; in Subsection (1) substituted "Subsection (2)" for "the conditions
herein stated"; substituted the present provisions of Subsection (3) for those set out in the
bound volume and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Accident involving emergency vehicle.
Ambulance service.
Construction.

Accident involving emergency vehicle.
In an action for injuries suffered by plaintiff
in an accident with a police vehicle which occurred at an intersection, the question as to
whether plaintiff had been contributorily negligent was one of fact for the jury, and an instruction on the issue of assumption of risk
from which jury could have believed that the
plaintiff would be barred from recovery by assumption of risk even if she had exercised due
care under the circumstances, was error. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884
(1959).
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages
incident to an intersection collision between
his car and car of defendant, a peace officer,
responding to an emergency call, where plaintiff was negligent in not hearing siren on defendant's car and defendant was driving at a
reasonable speed of forty miles per hour while
sounding siren and displaying a red light. Martin v. Ehlers, 13 Utah 2d 236, 371 P.2d 851
(1962).
Ambulance service.
Ambulance operated by service registered

with public service commission, and involved
in accident while making emergency run was
"authorized emergency vehicle" within the
meaning of statute and was in privileged status with respect to speed limits and traffic signals despite contentions that ambulance driver
was negligent as matter of law for exceeding
speed limit and ignoring traffic signals and
that ambulance service was not "public service
corporation" within the meaning of law. Howe
v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159
(1966).

Construction.
The 1949 amendment placed limitations on
the right of emergency vehicles to proceed past
a red stop light. The red light must be burning
on the vehicle and the siren sounding and the
vehicle could proceed past the red stop light
only after slowing down as may be necessary
for safe operation. Thus the driver of a fire engine was negligent in passing through a red
light with his siren and red light on but failing
to slow down at the intersection for safe operation. Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P.2d
838 (1954).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles
11.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 208.

41-6-15. Persons riding
chapter.

=

or driving

animals

subject

to

A person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a
roadway is subject to this chapter, except the penalties regarding operator
licenses specified under the alcohol or drug related traffic offenses do not
apply.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 6; C. 1943,
57-7-83; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 5; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 8.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "the penalties regarding op-

erator licenses specified under the alcohol or
drug related traffic offenses do not apply" for
"those provisions which by their nature can
have no application" at the end.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321
(Utah 1986).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein from

collision with runaway horse, or horse left unattended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653.

41-6-16. Uniform application
ordinances.

of chapter -

Effect of local

The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in
conflict with this chapter.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943,
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "chapter" for "act" and "ordinance" for "regulation" throughout the section

and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.
Cross-References. - Powers and duties of
all cities, traffic regulations, § 10-8-30.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 17, 206.
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles
7.
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Regulatory powers of local authorities - Trafficcontrol device affecting state highway - Necessity of erecting traffic-control devices.

(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of police power, from:
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic moving in one direction under Section 41-6-60;
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or
junction;
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 27-12-145;
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee;
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of
vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48;
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 41-6-42;
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59;
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65;
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe
movement of traffic;
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3);
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets;
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business district or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section
41-6-77;
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under Section 41-6-82.10;
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts;
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboards, and
other toy vehicles;
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental ordinances as
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions;
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed
limits;
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this
chapter.
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop
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before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation.
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m),
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice
of the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the
highway or part of it affected as is appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17, enacted by L.
1979,ch. 242, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 337, § 1; 1987,
ch. 138, § 10.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979,
ch. 242, § 2 repealed former section 41-6-17 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 8; C. 1943, 57-7-85; L. 1949, ch.
65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to the regulatory powers of local authorities, and trafficcontrol devices, and enacted present section
41-6-17.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the former provisions of
this section as last amended by Laws 1983, ch.

337, § l; in Subsection (1) deleted "streets and"
preceding "highways," in Subsection (l)(b) substituted "peace officers" for "police officers," in
Subsection (l)(e) substituted "which supersede" for "notwithstanding the provisions of'
and added at the end "regarding speed limits,"
in Subsection (l)(q) substituted "highway" for
"roadway," in Subsections (l)(u) and Subsection (l)(w) substituted "ordinances" for "regulations"; in Subsection (3) substituted "ordinances" for "regulations"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the entire section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidentiary rules.
Parking of vehicles.

Evidentiary rules.
City had no express or implied power, under
Subsection (a)(l), to make presence of illegally
parked vehicle prima facie evidence that owner
committed or authorized the violation. Nasfell
v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507
(1952).

Parking of vehicles.
A city has no power to pass an ordinance
declaring owners of vehicles prima facie responsible for illegal parking of such vehicles.
Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d
507 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 15 to 17, 219,

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e=- 7.

221.

41-6-17.5. Private roads and parking areas.
(1) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance provide that privately-owned and maintained roads or parking areas within the city or
county, as described in the ordinance, are subject to this chapter, provided:
(i) the roads or parking areas are generally held open for use of the
public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking to serve commercial
establishments;
(ii) the privately-owned and maintained road is so connected with
a highway that the public would not reasonably be able to determine
that it is a privately-owned and maintained road; or
(iii) a majority of the owners of the privately owned and maintained road have signed a petition and submitted it to the municipal397
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ity or county, requesting that the road be included in an ordinance
enacted under this section.
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this subsection without a
public hearing and without the agreement of the owner of the privatelyowned and maintained highway or parking area involved.
(2) The department is not required under this section to patrol or enforce
any provisions of this chapter on any privately-owned and maintained road or
parking area, but is required to enforce those provisions of this chapter applicable to private property other than under this section.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 33, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 33

41-6-18.

became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Right of real property owner to regulate traffic.

This chapter does not prevent the owner of real property used by the public
for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner and not as matter
of right from prohibiting the use, or from requiring other or different or additional conditions other than those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regulating the use as preferred by the owner, except as may be required under
Section 41-6-17.5.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 9; C. 1943,
57-7-86; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 11; 1988, ch. 33,
§ 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "This chapter does not" for
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to" at
the beginning and at the end substituted "the
use as preferred by the owner" for "such use as

may seem best to such owner" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, inserted "other" following "additional
conditions" and added "except as may be required under Section 41-6-17.5" at the end of
the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ,s,, 10.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 205.

41-6-19.

Removal of plants or other obstructions impairing view - Notice to owner - Penalty.

(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his property any tree,
plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by obstructing the view
of any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard.
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any local authority determines upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that a traffic
hazard exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the hazard be removed
within ten days.
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazard within ten days is
a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-19, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, § 3; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 12.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979,

ch. 242, § 3 repealed former section 41-6-19(L.
1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating to removal of brush,
foliage, or other obstructions impairing viewof
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intersections or railroad grade crossings, and
enacted present section 41-6-19.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (3) substituted "is a class C
misdemeanor" for "shall constitute an offense
punishable by a penalty of $50 and every day

41-6-20

said owner shall fail to remove it shall be a
separate and distinct offense" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ,:;;:,6.

41-6-19.10. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 41-6-19.10 (L. 1975, ch.
207, § 2), relating to an owner's duty to remove brush, foliage, or other obstruction im-

pairing a driver's view, and providing a penalty, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74.

ARTICLE 3
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS
41-6-20. Manual and specifications
traffic-control devices.

for uniform system of

(1) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this chapter for use upon highways within this state. The manual
shall correlate with and where possible conform to the system set forth in the
most recent revised edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways" and other standards issued or endorsed by the
Federal Highway Administrator.
(2) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices for school crossing zones,
which shall supplement Part VII of the manual adopted under Subsection (1).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 10; C. 1943,
57-7-87; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 4; 1986, ch. 45,
§ 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 13.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment designated the existing language as Subsection (1) and made various stylistic changes
in the subsection and added Subsection (2).

The 1987 amendment substituted "Transportation Commission" for "Department of Transportation" in both places it appears and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 232 to 234.
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C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ¢ca 10.
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Placing and maintenance upon state highways Restrictions on local authorities.

(1) The Department of Transportation shall place and maintain traffic-control devices in conformance with its manual and specifications upon all state
highways as it finds necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of
this chapter or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic.
(2) A local authority may not place or maintain any traffic-control device
upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation
except by the latter's permission.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 11; C. 1943,
57-7-88; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 5; 1987, ch. 138, § 14.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "shall deem" for "finds" and

"chapter" for "act" in Subsection (1); in Subsection (2) substituted "A local authority may not"
for "No local authority shall"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Highways: governmental duty to
provide curve warnings or markings, 57
A.L.R.4th 342.

41-6-22.

Placing and maintenance upon local highways by
local authorities.

Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and maintain
official traffic-control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they
find necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or
local traffic ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All traffic-control devices erected under this section shall conform to and be maintained in
conformance with the Department of Transportation manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices under Section 41-6-20.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 12; C. 1943,
57-7-89; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 15.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "chapter" for "act", substituted "Department of Transportation manual

and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices under § 41-6-20" for "state
manual and specifications" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Arn. Jur. 2d Autornobiles and Highway Traffic § 233.
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A.L.R. - Highways: governmental duty to

provide curve warnings or markings, 57
A.L.R.4th 342.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles eco 10.

400

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-24

41-6-23. Obeying devices - Effect of improper position,
illegibility, or absence - Presumption of lawful
placement and compliance with_ chapter.
(1) The operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device placed or held in accordance with this chapter unless at the
time otherwise directed by a peace officer, and subject to the exceptions
granted the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle.
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which official traffic-control devices are required, may not be enforced against an alleged violator if at
the time and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in
proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person.
(b) When a particular section does not state that official traffic-control
devices are required, the section is effective even though no devices are
erected or in place.
(3) When official traffic-control devices are placed or held in a position
approximately conforming to the requirements of this chapter, the devices are
presumed to have been placed or held by the official act or direction of lawful
authority, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence.
(4) An official traffic-control device placed or held under this chapter and
purporting to conform to the lawful requirements pertaining to that device is
presumed to comply with the requirements of this chapter, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 13; C. 1943,
57-7-90;L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1969, ch. 104,
§ I; 1978, ch. 33, § 6; 1987, ch. 138, § 16.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "operator"
for"driver'' both places it appears and substi-

tuted "peace officer" for "police officer"; in Subsection (2) inserted designations; and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Duty to obey police
officers, § 41-6-13.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident,
otherthan direct collision with pedestrian, as
affectedby reliance upon or disregard of stopand-gosignal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12.
Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrianas affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 155.
Liabilityfor automobile accident at intersectionas affectedby reliance upon or disregard of
"yield"sign or signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 275.
Liabilityfor automobile accident at intersec-

tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of
unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180.
Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of
unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign
or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507.
Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance
upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other
than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

41-6-24. Traffic-control

signal - At intersections - At
place other than intersection - Color of light signal.

(1) When traffic is controlled by a traffic-control signal exhibiting different
coloredlights, or color lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combi1Mtion,
only the colors green, red, and yellow may be used, except for special
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pedestrian signals carrying a word legend. The lights shall indicate and apply
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as provided in this section.
(2) "Green" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a circular green signal may proceed
straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at that place prohibits
either turn. But the vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or
left, shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time the
signal is exhibited.
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal shown alone or in
combination with other indication, may cautiously enter the intersection
only to make the movement indicated by the arrow or other movement as
is permitted by other indications shown at the same time. The vehicular
traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians facing any green signal except when the sole
green signal is a turn arrow may proceed across the roadway within any
marked or unmarked crosswalk.
(3) Steady "Yellow" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow
signal is warned that the "Red" signal will be exhibited next.
(b) Pedestrians facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow signal,
unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Section
41-6-25 are advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway
before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian may then start to
cross the roadway.
(4) Steady "Red" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall stop before
entering the intersection at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before
entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection and shall
remain stopped until an indication to proceed is shown, except as provided in Subsection (4)(c).
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians facing a steady red signal alone may not enter
the roadway.
(c) Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn, vehicular traffic
facing any steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn
right, or may turn left from a one-way street into a one-way street, after
stopping as required by Subsection (4)(a). The vehicular traffic shall yield
the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and
to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
(5) The provisions of this section apply where an official traffic-control signal is erected and maintained at a place other than an intersection. Any stop
required shall be made at a sign or marking on the highway pavement indicating where the stop shall be made, but, in the absence of any sign or marking, the stop shall be made at the signal.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 14; C. 1943,
57-7-91; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1951, ch. 73, § 1;
1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1973, ch. 81, § 1; 1975, ch.

207, § 10; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 17.
Amendment
Notes. -
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ment designated the former introductory paragraph as present Subsection (1) and in the subsection substituted "operators" for "drivers";
designated former Subsection (1) as present
Subsection (2) and redesignated subsequent
subsections accordingly; in Subsection (3)(a)
substituted "next" for "immediately thereafter
and such vehicular traffic shall not enter the

41-6-26

intersection when the 'Red' signal is exhibited"; in Subsection (5) deleted at the end of the
first section "The provisions of this section
shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their nature can have no application"; and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident,
other than direct collision with pedestrian, as
affected by reliance upon or disregard of stopand-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12.
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-

tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of
unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180.
Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of
unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign
or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507.

41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals signals - Rights and duties.

Meaning of

When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the words "Walk" or
"Don't Walk" or symbols of "Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in
place, the signals indicate:
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of "Walking Person" means a
pedestrian facing the signal may proceed across the roadway in the direction of the signal and the operators of all vehicles shall yield the right-ofway to him.
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" means a pedestrian may not start to cross the roadway in the direction of the signal,
but a pedestrian who has partially completed his crossing on the walk
signal shall proceed to a sidewalk or safety island while the "Don't Walk"
or "Upraised Palm" signal is showing.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 15; C. 1943,
57-7-92;L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 18.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in the opening clause inserted "or symbolsof'Walking Person"'; in Subsection (a) inserted "Flashing or steady" preceding "Walk,"

and inserted "or symbol of 'Walking Person'
means a pedestrian" and substituted "operators" for "drivers"; in Subsection (b) inserted
"Flashing or steady" at the beginning and inserted "or 'Upraised Palm"' in two places; and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.LR. - Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian as affected by reliance
upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2
A.L.R.3d 155.

Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance
upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other
than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals - Rights and duties of operators - Railroad grade crossings excluded.
(1) When an illuminated flashing red or yellow signal is used in a traffic
signal or with a traffic sign, vehicular traffic shall obey it as follows:
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(a) Flashing red stop signal: When a red signal is illuminated by rapid
intermittent flashes, operators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marked
stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the nearest side of
the intersection, or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering. The right to proceed is subject to the rules
applicable after making a stop at a stop sign.
(b) Flashing yellow caution signal: When a yellow signal is illuminated
with rapid intermittent
flashes, operators of vehicles may proceed
through the intersection or past the signal only with caution.
(2) This section does not apply at railroad grade crossings. Provisions regarding vehicles approaching railroad grade crossings are under Section
41-6-95.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 16; C. 1943,
57-7-93; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 12; 1987, ch. 138, § 19.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the subsections, substituted

41-6-26.5.

"signal" for "lens" and "operators" for "drivers"
throughout
the section and made minor
changes in phraseology
and punctuation
throughout the section.

Lane use control signals -

Colors.

When lane use control signals are placed over individual lanes, the signals
indicate and apply to operators of vehicles as follows:
(1) Green signal - vehicular traffic may travel in any lane over which
a green signal is shown.
(2) Steady yellow signal - vehicular traffic is warned that a lane control change is being made.
(3) Steady red signal - vehicular traffic may not enter or travel in any
lane over which a red signal is shown.
(4) Flashing yellow signal - vehicular traffic may use the lane only for
the purpose of approaching and making a left turn.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-26.5, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 105, § 1; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 8; 1987,
ch. 138, § 20.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operators" for "drivers" in

41-6-27.

the opening clause and substituted "signal" for
"indication" throughout the section and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights
or markings - Commercial advertising - Public
nuisance - Removal.

(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any
highway any unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or
railroad sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or
which:
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic;
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official
traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal; or
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and so positioned as to blind
or dazzle an operator on any adjacent highway.
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(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may any public authority permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing on it any commercial
advertising except for business signs included as part of official motorist service panels approved by the Department of Transportation. This provision
does not prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent to highways of
signs giving useful directional information and of a type that may not be
mistaken for official signs.
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is declared to be a
public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highways may
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 17; C. 1943,
57-7-94; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, § 1;
1987, ch. 138, § 21.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this section; in Subsection (l)(c) substituted "operator"
for "driver"; in Subsection (2) inserted "except

41-6-28. Interference
1

for business signs included as part of official
motorist service panels approved by the Department of Transportation" at the end of the
first sentence; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

with signs and signals prohibited.

A person may not without lawful authority attempt to or in fact alter,
deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any
railroad sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia on it, or any other
part of it.
History: L 1941, ch. 52, § 18; C. 1943,
57-7-95; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 22.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS
41-6-29. Operator's duty at accident - Stop at accident Penalty.
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and
remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of
Section 41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 19; C. 1943,
57-7-96; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1983, ch. 183,
§ 31; 1986, ch. 178, § 27; 1987, ch. 92, § 54;
1987, ch. 138, § 23.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment inserted "of Subsection (1)" and "shall
be" following "county jail," substituted "is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor; a penalty of'
for "shall upon conviction be punished by" and

"and a fine imposed shall be" for "nor more
than one year or by fine of," and deleted "or by
both such fine and imprisonment" from the
end, all in Subsection (b); and made minor
word changes in the first sentence of Subsection (a) and in Subsection (b).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 92,
changed the subsection designations.
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, re-
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designated former Subsections (a) and (b) as
last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 27 as
present Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection
(1) substituted "operator" for "driver"; in Subsection (2) deleted at the end "a penalty of imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not
less than 30 days, and a fine imposed shall be
not less than $100 nor more than $5,000"; deleted former Subsection (c), which read "The
department shall revoke the operator's license
of the person so convicted for a period not to

exceed one year"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Penalty for misdemeanors,
§§ 76-3-204,
76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Newly discovered evidence.
Where, in prosecution of hit-and-run driver
under this section, evidence is discovered after
the jury has retired to commence their deliberations which would sustain defendant's defense

of alibi, it is abuse of discretion and reversible
error to refuse to grant a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, which
was not merely cumulative. State v. Duncan,
102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121 (1942).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Stalking the Good
Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the
Duty to Rescue, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 529.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 289 et seq., 363,
382.

41-6-30.

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 43; 61A
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 674 to 683.
A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of showing in a criminal prosecution under a "hit-andrun" statute accused's knowledge of accident,
injury, or damage, 23 A.L.R.3d 497.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <i=> 10, 336.

Accidents involving damage to vehicle or property - Stop at accident.

The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage
to a vehicle or other property which is operated or attended by any person,
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to it
as possible, and shall immediately return to and remain at the scene of the
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop
may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 20; C. 1943,
57-7-97; L. 1977, ch. 269, § l; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 6; 1987, ch. 138, § 24.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in the first sentence substituted "operator" for "driver" and "operated" for "driven,"

41-6-31.

Accident
damage
owner.

omitted the former last sentence, which read
"Any person failing to stop or comply with said
requirements under such circumstances shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

involving injury, death, or property
- Duties of operator, occupant, or

(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which is
operated or attended by any person shall:
(a) give to any persons involved his name, address, and the registration
number of the vehicle he is operating;
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(b) upon request and if available exhibit his operator's license to any
investigating peace officer present and to the person struck or the operator or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or owner of other
property damaged in the accident; and
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance,
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the transporting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the
transporting is requested by the injured person.
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
or death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $400 or
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication available give notice of the accident to the nearest office of an authorized law
enforcement agency.
(3) When the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an
immediate notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and
there is another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of
doing so, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice not given by
the operator.
(4) When the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of
an accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of
the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within
15 days after becoming aware of the accident make the report not made by the
operator.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943,
57-7-98;L 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 25.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the previously undesignated provisions of this section as amended by
Laws 1983, ch. 183, § 32; in Subsection (1), in
the introductory paragraph substituted "operator" for "driver," inserted "or other property"
following"damage to any vehicle," substituted

"operated" for "driven," in Subsection (l)(a) inserted "to any person involved" at the beginning, and in Subsection (l)(b) inserted "to any
investigating peace officer present and," substituted "operator" for "driver," substituted "or
owner of other property damaged in the accident" for "collided with and shall"; made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout Subsection (1); and added present
Subsections (2) through (4).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 294.
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the opera-

tor of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his
operator's license or the vehicle registration
certificate, 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other property - Duties of operator.
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in
damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and either
locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of other
property of the operator's name and address and the registration number of
the vehicle causing the damage, or shall attach securely in a conspicuous
place on the vehicle or other property a written notice giving the operator's
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name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the
damage. If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections
41-6-31(2) and (3).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 22; C. 1943,
57-7-99; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 2; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 26.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operator" for "driver"
throughout the section, in the present last sentence substituted "under Subsections 41-6-

31(2) and (3)" for "as provided in Section
41-6-34," omitted the former last sentence,
which read "Any person failing to comply with
said requirements under such circumstances is
guilty of an infraction" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. -

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 10.

41-6-33, 41-6-34.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 41-6-33 (L. 1941, ch. 52,
§ 23; C. 1943, 57-7-100), relating to accidents

resulting only in damage to fixtures legally
upon or adjacent to a highway, was repealed by
Laws 1977, ch. 269, § 6.

41-6-35.

Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, repeals§ 41-6-34
as last amended by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 7,
concerning reporting accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $400 or more. For
present provisions, see § 41-6-31.

Accident reports - Duty of operator and investigative officer to forward or render.

(1) The department may request any operator of a vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage
to the apparent extent of $400 or more to, within ten days after the request,
forward a written report of the accident to the department.
(2) The department may require any operator of a vehicle involved in an
accident, of which report is made under Subsection (1), to file supplemental
reports when the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the department and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the department.
(3) A written accident report is not required under this section from any
person who is physically incapable of making a report, during his period of
incapacity.
(4) Every peace officer, who in the regular course of duty, investigates a
motor vehicle accident described under Subsection (1), shall file a report of the
accident with the department within ten days after completing the investigation. The report shall be made either at the time of and at the scene of the
accident or later by interviewing participants or witnesses.
(5) The written reports required to be filed with the department by peace
officers and the information in them are not privileged or confidential.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943,
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86,
§ 1; 1969,ch. 106, § 1;1973,ch.82,§
1;1979,
ch. 242, § 8; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § l; 1987,
ch. 138, § 27.
Amendment Notes, - The 1986 (2nd S.S.)

amendment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted
"department may request any" and substituted
"to within ten days after the request" for "shall
within five days after such accident" and "the
accident" for "such accident" in Subsection (a);
substituted "is made under Subsection (a)" for
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"must be made as provided in this section" and
"when" for "whenever" in Subsection (b); substituted "this section" for "this chapter" and
deleted "such" preceding "incapacity" in Subsection (c); divided Subsection (d) into two sentences, substituting the language beginning
"described under Subsection (a)" at the end of
the first sentence and "The report shall be
made" at the beginning of the second sentence
for "of which report must be made as required
in this section"; substituted "later" for "thereafter" and deleted "shall, within five days after
completing such investigation, forward a written report of such accident to the department"
fromthe end, in Subsection (d); and substituted
"The" for "Such," "filed with the department"

41-6-35.5

for "forwarded," and "in them are not privileged or confidential" for "contained therein
shall not be privileged or held confidential" in
Subsection (e).
The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this section as last amended by Laws
1983, ch. 183, § 32, substituted "operator" for
"driver" throughout the section, in Subsections
(4) and (5) substituted "peace officers" for "law
enforcement officers" and made minor changes
in phraseology and punctuation throughout
the section.
Cross-References.
Accident reports,
§ 41-12a-502.
Filing of false report, § 41-12a-602.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Manslaughter.
Reports as basis for determination

of security deposit.

Manslaughter.
Acquittal under former statute was not bar
to manslaughter
prosecution.
State
v.
Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 P. 762 (1924).
Reports as basis for determination of security deposit.
Order of commission revoking plaintiffs'
driving licenses due to their failure to deposit
security after accident was authorized even

though, after expiration of fifty days, no injured party had manifested an intent to seek
compensation and none had filed proof under
former Safety Responsibility Act; commission
could require deposit on basis of reports or
other evidence and suspend licenses for failure
to furnish deposit. Simmons v. State, Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 24 Utah 2d 146, 467 P.2d 414
(1970).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles -s=> 10.

41-6-35.5. Vehicle accidents - Investigation and report of
operator security - Agency action if no security
- Surrender of plates - Penalties.
(1) When a peace officer investigating an accident involving a motor vehicle cites the operator of a motor vehicle involved for the alleged violation of
any provision of this title, the cited operator shall at the peace officer's request
provide evidence of the owner's or operator's security required by Section
41-12a-301.
(2) The peace officer shall record on a form approved by the department the
information provided by the operator, and also indicate if the operator provided insufficient or no information. The officer shall also note on the form if
he finds reasonable cause to believe that any information given is not correct.
(3) The peace officer shall deposit all completed forms with his agency,
which shall forward the forms to the department no later than ten days after
receipt.
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(4) The department shall within ten days of receipt of the forms from the
agency take action as follows:
(a) If the operator provided no information under Subsection (1), the
department shall take direct action under Subsection 41-2-128(12).
(b) If the peace officer noted or the department determines that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the information given under Subsection
(1) is not correct, the department shall contact directly the insurance
company or other provider of security as described in Subsection (7) and
request verification, which the department may require to be in writing,
within 30 days of receipt of the request, of the accuracy of the information
submitted as of the date of the traffic offense for which the citation was
issued.
(c) If the department does not receive verification within 35 days after
mailing the request, or within the 35 days receives notice that the information was not correct, the department shall take action under Subsection 41-2-128(12).
(5) (a) The owner of a vehicle with unexpired license plates for which security is not provided as required under this chapter, shall return the plates
for the vehicle to the Motor Vehicles Division unless specifically permitted by statute to retain them.
(b) If the owner fails to return the plates as required, they shall be
confiscated under Section 41-2-134.
(6) The department may make rules for the enforcement of this section.
(7) In this section, "evidence of owner's or operator's security" means:
(a) the name of the insurance company which issued the insurance
policy under Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(a), and the number of the insurance policy;
(b) the name of the surety which issued the surety bond under Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b), and the number of the insurance policy;
(c) the number of the certificate of deposit issued by the state treasurer
under Section 41-12a-406; or
(d) the number of the certificate of self-funded coverage issued by the
department under Section 41-12a-407.
(8) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less
than $100, who:
(a) when requested to provide security information under Subsection
(1) provides false information;
(b) falsely represents to the department that security required under
this chapter is in effect; or
(c) sells a vehicle to avoid the penalties of this section as applicable
either to himself or a third party.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-35.5, enacted by L.
1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 28;
L. 1988, ch. 98, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace officer" for "officer" in the second place it appears;
in Subsection (2) substituted "peace officer" for
"officer" in the first place it appears; in Subsection (4)(a) substituted
"41-2-128(12)" for
"41-2-19(11)," in Subsection (4)(b) substituted
"peace officer" for "officer" and substituted

"Subsection (7)" for "Subsection (6)," and in
Subsection (4)(c) substituted "41-2-128(12)" for
"41-2-19(11)"; in Subsection (5)(a) added at the
end "unless specifically permitted by statute to
retain them," and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "41-2-134" for "41-2-23.5"; and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, inserted "which the department may require to be" near the middle in Subsection
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(4)(b), redesignated former Subsection (9) as
present Subsection (8)(c), and deleted "A person is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and
shall be fined not less than $100 who" at the
beginning thereof.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1986 (2nd S.S.),

ch. 4, § 4 makes the act effective on July 1,
1986.
Cross-References.
- Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

41-6-36. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, repeals§ 41-6-36 as last amended by Laws 1979,
ch. 269, § 4 concerning the physical incapacity

of
§

drivers.
41-6-31.

For

present

provisions,

41-6-37. Accident reports - Forms - Contents ties for failure to make report.

see

Penal-

(1) The department shall prepare and upon request supply to police departments, justices of the peace, sheriffs, garages, and other appropriate agencies
or individuals, forms for accident reports as required in this article, suitable
for the persons required to make the reports and the purposes to be served.
The written reports to be made by persons involved in accidents as requested
by investigating officers shall require sufficiently detailed information to disclose the cause, conditions then existing, and the persons and vehicles involved in the traffic accident.
(2) Every accident report requested under Section 41-6-35 shall be made in
writing and on the appropriate form approved by the department. It shall
contain all of the information required which is available.
(3) The department shall suspend the license or permit to operate a vehicle
and any nonresident operating privileges of any person failing to report an
accident as requested under Section 41-6-35 until the report has been filed.
The department may extend the suspension, not to exceed 30 days. Any person convicted of failing to make a report under Section 41-6-35 is punishable
under Section 41-6-164.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 27; C. 1943,
57-7-104;L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 86,
§ 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 9; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4,
§ 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 29.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 (2nd S.S.)
amendment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted
"requested under§ 41-6-35 shall" for "required
to"in Subsection (b); deleted former Subsection
(c); redesignated former Subsection (d) as
present Subsection (c); substituted "requested
under § 41-6-35" for "herein provided" in the
first sentence of present Subsection (c) and

"under § 41-5-35 is punishable under" for "as
required herein shall be punished as provided
in" in the second sentence of that subsection;
and made other, minor word changes throughout the section.
The 1987 amendment redesignated the subsections of this section as last amended by
Laws 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 3, in Subsection
(3) substituted "operate a vehicle" for "drive"
and "41-6-35" for "41-5-35," and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 10.
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Livestock on highway - Restrictions - Collision,
action for damages.

(1) A person owning or in the possession or control of any livestock, may not
willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or remain unaccompanied by a person in charge or control of the livestock upon a highway,
both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated from the
highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or building. This subsection does not apply to range stock drifting onto any highway in going to or
returning from their accustomed ranges.
(2) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or across any highway
during the period from half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning lights on
continual duty to open the road to permit the passage of vehicles.
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator, or occupant of a
motor vehicle or by their personal representatives or assignees, or by the
owner of the livestock for damages caused by collision with any domestic
animal or animals on a highway, there is no presumption that the collision
was due to negligence on behalf of the owner or the person in possession of
livestock.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 28; C. 1943,
57-7-105; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 30.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment inserted subsection designations, in Subsection (3) substituted "operator" for "driver"

and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Livestock highways,
§ 27-12-117 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
No presumption provision.
Constitutionality.
This section and § 4-25-8 do not unconstitutionally discriminate among similarly situated
plaintiffs in actions involving unrestricted
livestock merely because each provision imposes a different burden of proving liability.
The legislature reasonably could have concluded that people's interest in the crops,
fences and even personal security on their own
land is both greater and different in kind than
travelers' interest in safety on the highway.
Vaderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1987).
No presumption provision.
This provision is clear and unambiguous and

in an action where plaintiffs motorcycle collided with a horse on a highway, it means that
there is no presumption that the defendant was
guilty in permitting the horses to be upon the
highway under the conditions that were found
there and the burden rests upon the plaintiff to
establish acts of negligence. Hyrum Smith Estate Co. v. Peterson, 227 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.
1955).
Trial court properly directed verdict for defendant owner of horse struck by vehicle, since
under this section the mere fact defendant's
horses escaped from enclosure was not sufficient to justify submitting defendant's negligence to jury. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d
375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein from
collision with runaway horse, or horse left unattended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653.
Liability of governmental entity for damage
to motor vehicle or injury to person riding

therein resulting from collision between vehicle and domestic animal at large in street or
highway, 52 A.L.R.4th 1200.
Liability for killing or injuring, by motor vehicle, livestock or fowl on highway, 55
A.L.R.4th 822.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 10.

41-6-38.5. Peace officer investigating accident to notify
owner if livestock or broken fence involved
Exempt from liability.
(1) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in injury or death of
any livestock shall make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the
owner of the livestock and inform the owner of the injured or dead animal.
(2) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in a broken fence, if
it appears the fence contains or controls the movement of livestock, shall
make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the owner of the property
and inform the owner of the broken fence.
(3) Civil or criminal liability for claims does not arise against any peace
officer for failure to locate the owner of the livestock or property. This subsection does not preclude disciplinary action by the department against a peace
officer for failure to perform duties required by this section.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-38.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 127, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 31.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein from

collision with runaway horse, or horse left unattended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653.

41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged vehicle without
damage sticker.
(1) The person in charge of any garage or repair shop who receives a vehicle
which shows evidence of having been involved in an accident for which a
written report may be requested under Section 41-6-35, or having been struck
by any bullet, shall report the vehicle to the. nearest office of an authorized
law enforcement agency within 24 hours after the vehicle is received by the
garage or repair shop, giving the vehicle identification number, registration
number, and the name and address of the owner or operator of the vehicle.
(2) , If a damaged vehicle sticker describing the damage is affixed to the
vehicle, a report under this section is not required.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 29; C. 1943,
57-7-106; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 5; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 32.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment inserted subsection designations, in Sub-

section (1) substituted "shall report the vehicle
to the nearest office of an authorized law enforcement agent" for "shall report to the local
police department if such garage is located
within a municipality, otherwise to the office of
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county sheriff or the nearest office of the state
highway patrol" and made minor changes in

phraseology and punctuation
section.

throughout thi

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 717.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 363.

41-6-40.

Accident reports - When confidential - Insurance policy information - Use as evidence Penalty for false information.

(1) All written reports required in this article to be forwarded to the department by operators or owners of vehicles involved in accidents or by garages
are without prejudice to the reporting individual and are for the confidential
use of the department or other state agencies having use for the records for
accident prevention purposes. However, the department may disclose the
identity of a person involved in an accident when the identity is not otherwise
known or when the person denies his presence at the accident. The department shall disclose whether any person or vehicle involved in an accident
reported under this section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and the
name of the insurer.
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the
department shall furnish upon demand of any party to the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or
has not been made to the department in compliance with law, and if the report
has been made, the date, time, and location of the accident, the names and
addresses of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved, and the investigating officers. The reports may be used as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3).
(3) A person who gives information in oral or written reports as required in
this chapter knowing or having reason to believe that the information is false
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-40, enacted by L.
1979, ch.242, § 10; 1986, ch. 178,§ 28; 1987,
ch. 138, § 33.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979,
ch. 242, § 10 repealed former § 41-6-40 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 30; C. 1943, 57-7-107; L. 1949,
ch. 65, § 1), relating to accident reports and
their use in evidence, and enacted present
§ 41-6-40.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment made minor word changes in Subsections
(a) and (b) and substituted "is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor" for "shall be fined, upon conviction, not more than $1,000, or imprisoned

for not more than one year, or both" in Subsection (c).
The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this section as last amended by Laws
1986, ch. 178, § 28, in Subsection (1) substituted "operators" for "drivers" near the beginning and added the present last sentence, and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Access to accident reports, § 41-12a-202.
Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204,
76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 289 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A.L.R. -Admissibility
of police officer's tes-

timony at state trial relating to motorist's admissions made in or for automobile accident
report required by law, 46 A.L.R.4th 291.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <:!=> 10.

41-6-41. Statistical information regarding accidents -Annual publication.
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and
shall publish annually, or at more frequent intervals, related statistical information as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 31; C. 1943,
57-7-108; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 34.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology.

41-6-42. Local powers to require report.
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator of a vehicle
involved in any accident, or the owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a written report of the accident or a copy of any
report required under this article to be filed with the department on accidents
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confidential use of the
municipal department and are subject to Section 41-6-40.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 32; C. 1943,
57-7-109;L. 1979, ch. 242, § 11; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 35.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" for "driver", sub-

stituted "report required under this article" for
"report herein required" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. -Admissibility
of police officer's testimony at state trial relating to motorist's ad-

missions made in or for automobile accident
report required by law, 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND
RECKLESS DRIVING
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reckless
driving ordinances - Consistent with code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any
of those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary
presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any combination of those matters,
shall be consistent with the provisions in this code which govern those matters.
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(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving,
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern
those matters.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978,
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old§ 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch.
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75,
§ l; 1967, ch. 88, § l; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relating to powers of local authorities as to driving
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch.
242, § 12.

Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to
powers of local authorities, and enacted
present § 41-6-43.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operating" for "driving"
both places it appears in this section and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Cross-References. - Traffic regulations,
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of interim repeal.
Powers of cities.
Effect of interim repeal.
The interim repeal of this section did not
render municipalities without authority to
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the
influence of alcohol as municipalities had authority under their general police powers to
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-

cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980).
Powers of cities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt Lake City
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Arn. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq.

41-6-43.10.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch.
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12),

41-6-44.

C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 625
to 637.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 332.

relating to negligent homicide, was repealed
by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2.

Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration - Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
- Criminal punishment - Arrest without war•
rant - Penalties - Suspension or revocation of
license.

(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
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after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation
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or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility;
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by
the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75,
§ l; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977,
ch.268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983,
ch. 103,§ 1; 1983,ch. 183,§ 33; 1985,ch.46,
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29;
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2;
1988, ch. 17, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amendment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sentence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and second sentences, substituting "But" for "except
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into
the first and second sentences; substituted
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection
{5)(c);deleted "such time as" after "probation
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c);
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted person" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of
Subsections (7)(b) and (7){c); substituted "the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred" for "the violation is coupled
with an accident or collision in which the person is involved and when the violation has, in
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substituted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of' before
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation,
and style.
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122,
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "provided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days";
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for

"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days".
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178,
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor"
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and imprisonment" in the first sentence and the language beginning "is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" for "shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second
sentence.
The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1)
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable; in Subsection (2) added the phrase following "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor"
in the first sentence and deleted "any imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more
than one year" at the end of the second sentence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or";
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test"
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a),
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for
the former provisions which read "Percent by
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and
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substituted "community-service work program" for "community-service work project" in
Subsection (5)(b).
The 1988 amendment, effective March 2,
1988, divided Subsection (9) into two sentences
and rewrote the language following "any person," which had read "otherwise convicted under this section, except that the department
may subtract from arty suspension period the
number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130 if the
previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based."
Cross-References. - Assessment in addi-

tion to fine upon conviction, use for drinking
driver rehabilitation program, §§ 63-43-9 to
63-43-11.
Assessments to fund intoxicated driver rehabilitation account, § 63-43-10.
Automobile homicide, § 76-5-207.
Department of health to issue permits for
drawing of blood, § 26-1-30(19).
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influence, § 73-18-12.
Penalty for tnisdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204,
76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Actual physical control.
Automobile homicide prosecution.
Blood-alcohol test.
-Consent.
Breathalyzer affidavit.
Conflict between state and city authorities.
Conflict between state and municipal regulation.
Delay in arrest.
Evidence.
-Hearsay.
Included offense.
Jury question.
Jury trial.
Presumptions of intoxication.
Prior convictions.
-Procedure to be followed where alleged.
-Proof.
Probable cause to arrest.
Proof of intoxication.
Proof to sustain conviction.
-Insufficient.
-Sufficient.
Public intoxication.
Punitive damages.
-Double jeopardy.
Riding horse.
Venue.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
It was within the prerogative of the legislature to make it unlawful for one to drive avehicle while under the influence of liquor and to
provide a greater penalty if, while doing so, he
injured another by recklessness or negligence.
State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195,371 P.2d 27
(1962).
This section did not deal with two separate
subjects and thus transgress former Utah
Const., Art. VI, § 23 which required that legis-

lative acts must contain only one subject. State
v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27
(1962).
Former § 41-6-44.2 stated with sufficient
clarity and conciseness the two elements necessary to constitute its violation: a blood alcohol
concentration of .10%, and concurrent operation or actual physical control of any vehicle.
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974).

Actual physical control.
Defendant who was asleep in automobile,
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completely off traveled portion of highway
with engine shut off, was not in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. State v. Bugger, 25
Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971).

with the state statute. Layton City v. Glines,
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980).

Delay in arrest.
Where law enforcement officers on arriving
at scene of automobile collision found injured
defendant sitting on curb and took him to a
nearby hospital for treatment of his wounds
before making arrest, the delay in the arrest
was not unreasonable. State v. Bryan, 16 Utah
2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964).

Automobile homicide prosecution.
Presumption of intoxication arising from
presence of certain amount of alcohol in blood
was inapplicable to automobile homicide prosecution under former statute, and instructing of
jury on presumption was reversible error.
State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah 1974).

Evidence.

Blood-alcohol test.
After an accused has been lawfully placed
under arrest it is the duty of the officers to
make a search for evidence relative to the commission of the crime. The blood-alcohol test is
designed for that purpose. State v. Bryan, 16
Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964).
-Consent.
Where officer testified that he obtained the
defendant's consent to the taking of a blood-alcohol test, which fact was also attested by the
nurse and by the physician who took the blood
sample, the evidence left no doubt that defendant gave his consent to such a test. State v.
Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964).
Breathalyzer affidavit.
In a driving under the influence of alcohol
case, a defendant is not denied the constitutional right to confront witnesses by the state's
introduction of an affidavit for the purpose of
establishing that the breathalyzer was working properly. State v. Barneycastle, 699 P.2d
745 (Utah 1985).
The use of affidavits to establish the reliability and accuracy of breathalyzer evidence in
court is allowed. Absent such a showing, however, the court will not presume the accuracy
and reliability of the breathalyzer results especially when the evidence is being admitted under § 41-6-44.3, which compromises the right
of confrontation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735
P.2d 413 (Utah 1987).
Conflict between state and city authorities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt Lake City
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).
If city ordinance prescribed the punishment
for drunken driving as confinement in city jail,
court or judge was without authority to order
confinement in county jail. Ex parte Folck, 102
Utah 470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942). But see now
§ 41-6-43.
Conflict between state and municipal regulation.
Municipal ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol was enforceable
where, although not as extensive as the provisions of the state statute, it did not conflict
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-Hearsay.
In a proceeding to suspend a driver's license
the arresting officer's DUI report, the results of
the breathalyzer test, and the citation were not
admissible under the public records exception
to the hearsay rule due to lack of trustworthiness. Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Included offense.
Defendant could be prosecuted under this
section even though he had pleaded guilty to
driving without a license, without a registration certificate, and without a safety sticker,
since each citation charged a separate offense
entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 253 (Utah 1980).
Jury question.
Where evidence is conflicting, it is for the
jury to say whether defendant was guilty of
driving a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. State v. Stewart, 110 Utah
203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946).
Jury trial.
Defendants charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor
with maximum possible imprisonment of six
months, had no federally protected right to
jury trial, and therefore could claim no right to
six-member panel as opposed to four-member
juries which convicted them. State v. Nuttall,
611 P.2d 722 (Utah 1980).
Presumptions of intoxication.
In cases arising before the enactment of
§ 41-6-44.5, if state is unable to produce test
results sufficient to permit a presumption of
intoxication when the test was given, it must
provide expert testimony to extrapolate the results back to the time of the incident to show
defendant's blood alcohol level was sufficient
at that time to give rise to the presumption
before state is entitled to rely on the presumption at trial. State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 1267
(Utah 1978).
Prior convictions.
-Procedure
to be followed where alleged.
As a guide for future cases, where there is an
allegation of prior crimes or prior convictions,

421

41-6-44

MOTOR VEHICLES

the Supreme Court has outlined the procedure
to be followed in the trial courts, which will
properly expedite the adjudication of such
cases, while at the same time safeguarding the
substantial rights of accused persons, and prevent an accused person from being advertised
to the jury as one who previously perpetrated a
similar type of offense. State v. Stewart, llO
Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946), setting out the
procedure at length, following Connecticut
cases.
Proof.
Upon trial of information for drunken driving, introduction of evidence of prior convictions before a determination of the issue on the
substantive charge, even if erroneous, would
not warrant directing an acquittal, and evidence of prior conviction is admissible, even
though conviction followed plea of guilty, and
may be shown under proper procedure. But
until a verdict has been rendered on the principal issue, there is no occasion to mention prior
convictions, since previous offenses would not
be competent to prove that defendant committed the offense for which he is then on trial.
State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383
(1946), pointing out manner of showing prior
convictions from the records of justice and city
courts, notwithstanding informality of proceedings in such courts and lack of judgment book.
Where the defendant is charged with a prior
conviction of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
prior conviction. It was then the exclusive
province of the jury to determine from the evidence whether the state had done so. The trial
court's comments on the evidence and his limiting the jury's deliberation to whether the
record of the prior conviction was authentic
was error prejudicial to defendant. State v.
Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284, 39
A.L.R.2d 553 (1953).
Upon information charging defendant with
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and with commission of prior offense,
where the docket of the justice of the peace was
received in evidence, the page identified and
the verity of the entry stipulated to in open
court as being in the handwriting of the justice, the entry, under § 78-5-16, became prima
facie evidence of the facts so stated, and no
evidence to the contrary having been offered,
must be presumed to be correct and sustains
the court's finding of guilt of prior conviction.
State v. Bailey, 3 Utah 2d 254, 282 P.2d 339
(1955).
Probable cause to arrest.
There was probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol,
where the arresting officer was told by a store
clerk that defendant had driven up in a car

parked outside the store and the officer
watched defendant walk from the store in an
unsteady manner, smelled alcohol on his
breath, and caught him before he fell to the
ground while taking a field sobriety test. Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987)
(prosecution under identical municipal ordinance).
Proof of intoxication.
In a prosecution for automobile homicide
where there was competent, substantial, expert testimony that defendant's alcohol-blood
content was not only 0.15, but 0.224, which
would impair motor and sensory reactions, an
instruction by the court that 0.15 alcohol-blood
content raised a presumption that one would
be under the influence was not prejudicial.
State v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d 210, 364 P.2d 828
(1961).
Proof to sustain conviction.
Under former provision "operating an automobile on a public street or highway by one
under the influence of intoxicating liquor is itself an unlawful act and an offense." But a conviction of involuntary manslaughter will be reversed unless the charge is sufficiently proven.
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909
(1930), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 170
A.L.R. 542 (1943).
-Insufficient.
Testimony that three or four hours after accident liquor was detected by odor on defendant's breath does not prove the charge of
drunken driving, and driving an automobile in
violation of traffic rules or ordinances in one or
more particulars, or driving it negligently or
even recklessly, resulting in an accident, does
not relevantly tend to prove that the driver
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909
(1930), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 170
A.L.R. 542 (1943).
Where the hearing examiner suspended petitioner's driver's license based on the arresting
officer's sworn driving under the influence report (DUI), the results of the breathalyzer test,
and the citation, since the breathalyzer test results were inadmissible and that portion of the
DUI report indicating breathalyzer results was
also inadmissible because oflack of evidence of
proper maintenance of the breathalyzer or
competence of the test giver, then without admissible evidence demonstrating petitioner's
blood alcohol content was .08% or greater, the
department's decision to suspend the license
was arbitrary and capricious, there being no
submission of evidence indicating that petitioner was incapable of safe driving. Harry v.
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Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Where, in proceedings before a hearing examiner, the arresting officer's testimony did
not include statements regarding the calibration or maintenance of the intoxilyzer, nor
were there any affidavits submitted regarding
that issue, there is no indication that the intoxilyzer test was performed in accordance with
the standards established by the commissioner
of public safety, and the arresting officer's
statement that there was "no problem" with
the equipment is insufficient. Since references
to the intoxilyzer test in the DUI report were
inadmissible and should have been stricken,
the hearing examiner's decision to suspend appellant's license was not based on a residuum
o'f evidence competent in a court of law. Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

-Sufficient.
Conviction of the crime of involuntary manslaughter as the result of a collision between
an automobile, which defendant was driving,
and a pedestrian was upheld, where evidence
showed that he had imbibed to such a degree
that it was apparent to all who saw and heard
him that his locomotion and his power of
speech were markedly affected, and it appeared that such criminal negligence contributed to the death. A person who drives a car
while in such a condition is reckless and
evinces a marked disregard for the safety of
others and is therefore guilty of criminal negligence. State v. Capps, 111 Utah 189, 176 P.2d
873 (1947).
Breathalyzer test reading of .27 was sufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court
that defendant had operated his vehicle in a
willful and wanton disregard for the safety of
others. Ellefsen v. Robert, 526 P.2d 912 (Utah
1974).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, where he had been driving
erratically prior to a collision and made
unsolicited, voluntary statements while not in
custody. In re RLI, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Public intoxication.
Following an automobile collision defendant
was sitting on curb holding a handkerchief to
his head which was bleeding; there was a
strong odor of alcohol on his breath; he appeared to be intoxicated, and stated that he
was drunk. A bottle containing whiskey was
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found on the floor of his automobile. He was
taken to a nearby hospital where his wounds
were attended and he was placed under arrest
under this section for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated. Under such circumstances
arrest of defendant was justified though offense for which he was arrested was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer,
the defendant being intoxicated in a public
place in violation of the law, and upon death of
his passengers, he was charged with automobile homicide under former § 76-30-7.4. State
v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964).

Punitive damages.
Punitive damages are recoverable against a
drunken driver in an automobile personal injury case where it can be established: (1) that
the defendant motorist acted with actual malice or a reckless disregard of the rights and
safety of others; and (2) that his drunken driving was a contributing cause of the accident;
but the mere finding that a driver who was
involved in an accident was convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation
of this section would not allow the issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
-Double jeopardy.
The imposition of punitive damages against
a drunken driver in a civil action, who may
also be punished criminally for the same conduct, does not violate the double jeopardy prohibition in Utah's Constitution. Biswell v.
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Riding horse.
The defendant's conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol denied him
due process of law because this section does not
give him adequate notice that being intoxicated while riding a horse was a crime. The
definition of "vehicle" in § 41-6-1(53) cannot
be legitimately read to include horses. State v.
Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).
Venue.
Where the testimony adequately established
where the offense was committed, the court
will take judicial notice that that point is in
the county so that the venue has been sufficiently established. State v. Bailey, 3 Utah 2d
254, 282 P.2d 339 (1955).
Cited in State v. Chugg, 75 Utah Adv. Rep.
67 (Ct. App. 1988).
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Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155.
Utah Legislative Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah
L. Rev. 115, 175.
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 95, 96.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 296 to 311.
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628.
A.L.R. - Intoxication from specified percentage of alcohol present in system, construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference, 16 A.L.R.3d 748.
Drugs, driving under the influence, or when
addicted to use of as criminal offense, 17
A.L.R.3d 815.
Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle

41-6-44.1.

Procedures

-

on private property, of legislation making
drunken driving a criminal offense, 29
A.L.R.3d 938.
What constitutes driving, operating, or being
in control of motor vehicle for purposes of driving while intoxicated statute or ordinance, 93
A.L.R.3d 7.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.
Validity, construction, and application of
statutes directly proscribing driving with
blood-alcohol level in excess of established percentage, 54 A.L.R.4th 149.
Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI, 56
A.L.R.4th 1092.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ea, 332.

Adjudicative

proceedings.

The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the procedures and
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.1, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 142.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch. 161,

41-6-44.2.

1,

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 41-6-44.2 (L. 1973, ch.
80, § 2; 1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to
driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or

41-6-44.3.

315 makes the act effective on January
1988.

§

Standards
dence.

higher, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99,
§ 21.

for chemical

breath analysis -

Evi-

(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are
admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1)
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption
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that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14; 1987,
ch. 138, § 38.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (2) substituted "operating"

for "driving" both places it appears, inserted
"or any drug" following "influence of alcohol,"
inserted "or breath" following "with a blood"
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Ampoules used in test.
Breathalyzer affidavits.
Findings required.
Hearsay exception.
Inadmissible tests.
Proof to sustain conviction.
-Insufficient.
Rebuttable presumption.
Constitutionality.
Given the legitimate governmental interest
in not having to produce in every DUI case the
public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, and
the alternative means available to an accused
to cross-examine and confront such a witness,
this section does not violate the constitutional
right of confrontation when all of its requirements are met. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d
1314 (Utah 1983).
The procedure by which breath testing machines are checked is not so inaccurate as to be
a violation of a defendant's due process rights.
Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 (Utah
1987).
Ampoules used in test.
Since the ampoules used in the testing are
such an integral part of the breathalyzer
equipment, this section applies to such ampoules. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
Breathalyzer affidavits.
The use of affidavits to establish the reliability and accuracy of breathalyzer evidence in
court is allowed. Absent such a showing, however, the court will not presume the accuracy
and reliability of the breathalyzer results especially when the evidence is being admitted under this section, which compromises the right
of confrontation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735
P.2d 413 (Utah 1987).
Intoxilyzer testing affidavits were admissible, where the facts stated therein were based
upon the affiant's personal knowledge and observation as the person who conducted the ma-

chine testing procedures, and not upon someone else's hearsay information. Layton City v.
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Findings required.
Prior to the acceptance of affidavits to establish a presumption of validity of the test results, this section requires an affirmative finding by the trial court that the calibration and
testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer and the
ampoules were performed in accordance with
the standards established by the commissioner
of public safety, the affidavits were prepared in
the regular course of the public officer's duties,
that they were prepared contemporaneously
with the act, condition or event, and the source
of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness;
affidavits were inadmissible where the record
was devoid of such findings and where the affidavits showed on their face that the affiants
did not attest from their own personal knowledge. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
Hearsay exception.
So long as there is compliance with the mandates of this section, namely, contemporaneous
preparation in accordance with established
standards, in the regular course of the officer's
duties, and indications oftrusthworthiness, the
affidavits regarding the maintenance of a
breathalyzer machine are admissible under
this section as a valid statutory exception to
the hearsay rule. Murray City v. Hall, 663
P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).
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Inadmissible tests.
A breathalyzer test result was inadmissible
where an operational checklist, which was the
only foundation for admission of the test result,
was excluded for lack of a proper foundation.
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah
1987).
Proof to sustain conviction.
-Insufficient.
Where, in proceedings before a hearing examiner, the arresting officer's testimony did
not include statements regarding the calibration or maintenance of the intoxilyzer, nor
were there any affidavits submitted regarding
that issue, there is no indication that the intoxilyzer test was performed in accordance with

the standards established by the commissioner
of public safety, and the arresting officer's
statement that there was "no problem" with
the equipment is insufficient. Since references
to the intoxilyzer test in the DUI report were
inadmissible and should have been stricken,
the hearing examiner's decision to suspend appellant's license was not based on a residuum
of evidence competent in a court of law. Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

Rebuttable presumption.
Affidavits in compliance with the mandates
of this section establish a rebuttable presumption that the breathalyzer machine was functioning properly. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d
1314 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of proof
that tests of blood alcohol concentration were

41-6-44.5.

conducted in conformance
methods, 96 A.L.R.3d 745.

with

prescribed

Admissibility of chemical test results in actions
for driving under the influence - Weight of evidence.

(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section
41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is
given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15; 1987,
ch. 138, § 39.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979,
ch. 243, § 3 repealed former section 41-6-44.5
(L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1), relating to chemical
tests as evidence and the presumption of blood
alcohol level, and enacted present section
41-6-44.5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "operating"
for "driving," inserted "or drugs" following
"under the influence of alcohol," inserted "or

breath" following "with a blood"; deleted former Subsection (2) from this section as last
amended by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 15, relating
to the time of taking the chemical test; redesignated the subsequent subsection numbers; in
Subsection (2) inserted "or breath" following
"evidence of the person's blood" and substituted "operating" for "driving"; in Subsection
(3) substituted "or breath alcohol level or drug
level" for "alcohol level" and substituted "operating" for "driving"; and made minor changes
in phraseology and punctuation throughout
the section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Relation back of test results.
Results of chemical analysis test were not
required to be extrapolated back to the time of

41-6-44.8.

the incident by expert testimony to be admissible as evidence. State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d
1267 (Utah 1978).

Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may
prosecute for driving while license suspended or
revoked.

Alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person operating
a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked for a violation of
Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of
Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain
after having been originally charged with violating one or more of those
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as
well as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute
those alleged violations.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 102, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 40.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "41-2-136" for "41-2-28," sub-

stituted "person operating a vehicle" for "person driving" and deleted "or chauffeur's" following "while his operator's."

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or
drug - Number of tests - Refusal - Warning,
report - Hearing, revocation of license - Appeal - Person incapable of refusal - Results of
test available - Who may give test - Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test
427

41-6-44.10

MOTOR VEIDCLES

or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the division. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the
date of arrest.
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the division, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court
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decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the
revocation was improper.
(d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person
resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him .
. (5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer,
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16;
1987, ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987,
ch. 161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4;
1988, ch. 148, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1981,
ch. 126, § 43 repealed former § 41-6-44.10 (L.
1957, ch. 80, §[1]; 1959, ch. 65, § 1; 1967, ch.
88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3; 1977, ch. 268, § 4),

relating to implied consent to tests, and enacted present § 41-6-44.10.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 129, rewrote the provisions
of Subsection (2) as last amended by Laws
1983, ch. 99, § 16 to the extent that a detailed
analysis is impracticable and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the entire section.
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The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, designated the previously undesignated provisions of Subsections (1), (2) and (5) as last
amended by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 16; in Subsection (l)(a) substituted "operating" for "driving" in two places and inserted "or breath"
both places it appears; in Subsection (l)(b) substituted the present language for "the peace
officer shall determine which of the aforesaid
tests shall be administered"; in Subsection
(2)(a) substituted "chemical test or any one or
all of the tests requested" for "chemical test or
tests" and "operating" for "driving," and inserted "or breath" following "while having a
blood"; in Subsection (2)(b) substituted "operate" for "drive" and "Subsection 41-2-112(6), a
fee under Section 41-2-103" for "Subsection
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25"; in Subsection (2)(c) substituted "circuit court" for "district court" and
"trial upon ten days" for "trial de novo upon
ten days"; in Subsection (8) inserted "or any
additional test" following "chemical test or
tests" and substituted "operating'' for "driving"; and made minor changes in phraseology
and punctuation throughout the section.
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 161, effective January 1, 1988, added the paragraph designations within Subsections (1), (2), (5) and
(6), substituted "file a notice of agency action
notifying the person that he has a right to a
hearing" for "notify the person of a hearing'' in
Subsection (2)(c), substituted "may seek judicial review" for "shall have the right to file a
petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing
in the matter" in Subsection (2)(f)(i), substituted the language of Subsection (2)(f)(ii) for a
former provision relating to trial de novo, and

made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
June 5, 1987, substituted "are administered"
for "shall be administered" in the first sentence
in Subsection (l)(b); substituted "can result"
for "may result" near the end of the first sentence in Subsection (2)(a); in Subsection (2)(b),
added the first two sentences, deleted "and that
his request shall be made within ten days after
the date of arrest" from the end of the present
third sentence, and substituted "was requested" for "was granted the right" in the
fifth sentence; in Subsection (2)(c), substituted
"the district court" for "the circuit court" in the
first sentence.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
January 1, 1988, amended the section as described in the preceding paragraph, except
Subsection (2)(c), which was rewritten.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, added "except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 76-5-207" in the first sentence in Subsection (l)(b); divided former Subsection (2)(b) into present Subsections (2)(b)
and (2)(c); redesignated former Subsection
(2)(c) as Subsection (2)(d); and made a minor
change in punctuation.
Cross-References. - Chemical tests as evidence of intoxication, § 41-6-44.5.
Department of health to issue permits for
drawing of blood, § 26-1-30(19).
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influence, § 73-18-12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
-Standing
to raise.
Actual physical control.
Administration of test.
Chemical test.
-Intoxilizer.
Civil nature of statute.
Conditional consent.
Evidence.
Grounds for requesting test.
Immediate request.
Miranda warning.
Prerequisites for admission into evidence.
Presence of counsel.
Preservation of test samples.
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to submit to test.
Reasonable refusal.
Refusal to submit to test.
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Required submission to test.
-Self-incrimination.
Right to refuse test.
Stay of license suspension.
Sworn report of arresting officer.
Trial de novo in district court.
Warrantless search allowed.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
-Standing to raise.
Motorist who submitted to blood-alcohol test
and was convicted of driving while intoxicated
had no standing to challenge constitutionality
of this section, not having been convicted under or by reason of it. Salt Lake City v. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106 (1959).
Actual physical control.
To establish actual physical control of a vehicle for purposes of this section, it is unnecessary t.oshow actual intent to control the vehicle; intent to control a vehicle may be inferred
from the performance of those acts which constitute actual physical control. Garcia v.
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982).
There was an adequate showing that motorist was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle where motorist occupied the driver's
position behind the steering wheel of a motor
vehicle with possession of the ignition key and
with apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle; fact that vehicle was blocked by a
fence and another vehicle and could be moved
only a few feet did not preclude a finding of
actual
physical
control.
Garcia
v.
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982).
The "actual physical control" language of
this section should be read as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their
vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651
(Utah 1982).
Positioning in the driver's seat is an element
commonto all of the cases that have found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle.
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah
1986).

test, invoking the prov1s1ons of the implied
consent law. Collier v. Schwendiman, 709 P.2d
357 (Utah 1985).

Civil nature of statute.
Implied consent provisions are obviously
civil in nature, as opposed to criminal, since
they are devoid of criminal sanctions and provide only for revocation of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle, and since administrative
hearing may be had subsequent t.othe test followed by trial de novo. Cavaness v. Cox, 598
P.2d 349 (Utah 1979).
Conditional consent.
Defendant had no right to impose any conditions as a prerequisite to giving consent, and
demanding any unreasonable or impractical
conditions as a prerequisite was a refusal to
give consent. Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 241
(Utah 1978).

Chemical test.

Evidence.
Prior to the enactment of this section it was
held, in an action against the estate of a deceased for injuries arising out of an automobile
accident, that the testimony of a doctor who
made a blood test from blood taken from the
deceased's body without the consent of the deceased's parents was admissible in evidence.
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642
(1956).
Where defendant was injured in an automobile accident and taken to a hospital where a
physician directed a medical technologist to
draw a blood sample for cross-matching, and a
police officer directed the taking of a sample
for a blood alcohol test, the results of which
showed a blood alcohol level of .13%, results of
the test were properly admitted into evidence
at defendant's subsequent prosecution under
§ 76-5-207(1) for automobile homicide, because
the test was done at the direction and under
the supervision of defendant's doctor. State v.
Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977).
In a trial de novo, the district court must
determine by a preponderance of the evidence
whether the petitioner's license is subject to
revocation under the provisions of this chapter.
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah
1986).

-Intoxilizer.
A test administered through an intoxilizer,
or breath test machine, qualifies as a chemical

Grounds for requesting test.
Due process requires that peace officer must
have reasonable grounds for his belief that the

Administration of test.
An officer administering a breathalyzer test
under this section can require an arrested person t.ofurnish what the officer reasonably believes to be a viable sample, and the "green
light" that is activated when 55 c.c's of breath
have been acquired is merely an aid in making
that determination. Powell v. Cox, 608 P.2d
239 (Utah 1980).
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Presence of counsel.
Person had no right to presence of counsel
during taking of, or as condition of taking, any
test. Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah
1979); Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah
1979).

Proceeding to revoke license for failure to
submit to test.
Acquittal of the defendant under the criminal charge of driving under the influence is not
a bar to revocation of the driver's license for
failure to submit to a chemical test when requested to do so. Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979).
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license
for failure to submit to a chemical test when so
requested, driver is entitled to procedural due
process, although not to the same protections
afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution,
is not required to post bond nor appear at the
administrative hearing, cannot be fined or imprisoned either for his refusal to submit to a
test or for his failure to appear at the hearing,
and if he fails to appear or it is determined at
the hearing that he was granted the right to
submit to a chemical test and refused, the department's authority is limited to revocation of
the driver's license for one year. Ballard v.
State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah
1979).
The purpose of the administrative proceeding to revoke a driver's license for failure to
submit to a chemical test is to protect the public, not to punish drunken drivers; such drivers
are subject to separate criminal prosecution for
purposes of punishment. Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979).
The rule that the corpus delicti of the crime
must be established by evidence independent
of the accused's confession is not applicable to a
proceeding to revoke a driver's license for failure to submit to a chemical test since such proceeding is not criminal in nature. Ballard v.
State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah
1979).
Driver's license revocation proceeding for
failure to submit to a requested chemical test
requires proof only by a preponderance of the
evidence. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d
651 (Utah 1982).
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license
for failure to submit to a requested chemical
test, department of public safety has the burden to show arrested person was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
addition to showing that the arresting officer
had grounds to believe that the arrested person
was under the influence; the same evidentiary
burden must be met in a trial de novo in the
district court. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645
P.2d 651 (Utah 1982).

Preservation of test samples.
Law enforcement agencies are not required
by the federal constitution to take a separate
breath specimen and preserve that sample for
possible use by the defense in attempting to
challenge the breath test results. Layton City
v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 1987).

Reasonable refusal.
This section as amended in 1977 precluded
the defense of "reasonable refusal" as was contemplated by prior cases and now provides for
a simple "yes" or "no" to the officer's request to
take a test. Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349
(Utah 1979).

person requested to submit to the chemical test
was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; reasonable grounds exist where
the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge and of which he had reasonably
trustworthy
information are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the situation exists.
Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d
1302 (Utah 1979).

Immediate request.
Driver's request is not "immediate" where he
makes it after several refusals and after the
police officer administering the test had shut
the machine down and left the room.
Whitehouse v. Schwendiman, 723 P.2d 1084
(Utah 1986).
Miranda warning.
Rights explained in a Miranda warning to
remain silent and to consult an attorney do not
apply to the decision to take a chemical test; it
is incumbent on the arresting officer to explain
this unequivocally to the motorist, and questions of whether he did so explain it and
whether the motorist was confused and manifested his confusion to the arresting officer are
for the trier of fact to determine. Holman v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979); Muir v. Cox,
611 P.2d 384 (Utah 1980).
Since license revocation proceeding was not
a crim;nal proceeding, fact that officer who arrested motorist and requested him to take
breathalyzer test did not give him Miranda
warning did not render officer's testimony inadmissible in the revocation proceeding. Smith
v. Cox, 609 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1980).
Prerequisites for admission into evidence.
Chemical test could not be taken without
driver's consent prior to his arrest, so that district court erred in admitting results of test in
prosecution for automobile homicide where defendant had objected to taking of blood sample
and was not, at time blood sample was extracted, under arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968).
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Refusal to submit to test.
Where arrested motorist did not take a test
because of his having taken time to reach his
attorney and make up his mind whether to
submit, he had not "refused a chemical test"
and order revoking his driver's license was not
authorized. Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122,
458 P.2d 877 (1969).
Driver arrested for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, advised of
this law and of his constitutional rights, but
who pretends not to understand, refuses to
take breathalyzer test, and presents no reasonable cause for refusing to submit, has his
driver's license properly revoked as required
by Jaw. McCall v. Dorius, 527 P.2d 647 (Utah
1974).
The question of revocation of plaintiffs
driver's license for refusal to submit to a bloodalcoholtest was rendered moot by the failure of
the state to provide a "duly authorized laboratory technician"; drawing blood for the test
constitutes the practice of medicine and a technician performing the test is not duly authorized unless acting under the supervision or
direction of a medical practitioner. Gibb v.
Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), distinguished, State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah
1977).
Where, upon arrest for driving while intoxicated, officer asked defendant whether he
would submit to a "chemical test," and defendant replied that he would take a blood test
and that he wanted his physician present, to
both of which requests the officer agreed, subsequent failure to take blood test due to unavailability of physician and defendant's refusal to submit to breathalyzer test administered by arresting officer did not justify revocation of defendant's license. Gassman v. Dori us,
543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiff who, upon being arrested for driving while intoxicated, agreed in principle to
submit to the test required by this section, but
at police station refused to take it until her
attorney was present, did not refuse to submit
within the meaning of the statute where it appeared that she called her attorney and he
made a bona fide effort to appear within a reasonable time, but the police officer grew tired
of waiting and left without administering the
test; therefore, driver license division was not
justified in revoking plaintiffs license to drive.
Peterson v. Dorius, 547 P.2d 693 (Utah 1976).
Where plaintiff, immediately upon being arrested after she was involved in an accident,
and while still agitated and upset, was informed of the provisions of the implied consent
law and replied that the police officers did not
know what they were talking about, she did
not expressly refuse to take the test required
by this section, and the subsequent suspension

41-6-44.10

of her driver's license on that ground was
error. Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 (Utah
1976).
Police officers need not follow exactly the sequence of events set out in this section; language of statute indicating that notification of
consequences should be given after refusal to
submit to test did not impose requirement that
officer proceed in exactly that fashion, and officer's notification to defendant of consequences
of refusal prior to obtaining his answer as to
whether he would submit did not constitute
noncompliance with the statute. Elliott v.
Dorius, 557 P.2d 759 (Utah 1976).
The fact that defendant believed the breath
test to be unreliable, and therefore refused to
submit to it, did not constitute "reasonable
cause" for refusal within the contemplation of
the statute. Elliott v. Dorius, 557 P.2d 759
(Utah 1976).
Express verbal refusal is not necessary to
withdraw the consent implied by the statute,
which is only a fictional consent anyway; a refusal in fact, regardless of the words that accompany it, can be as convincing as an express
verbal refusal, and that includes playing verbal games with the officer to avoid a direct refusal. Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979).
Revocation of license was supported by substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence
that driver gave an explicit verbal refusal to
take chemical test after being properly
warned. Miles v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1344 (Utah
1979).
Motorist's refusal to take blood test until he
could call his lawyer constituted refusal under
the statute and a valid basis for revocation of
his license. Fjelsted v. Cox, 611 P.2d 382 (Utah
1980).
Where officer informed motorist of the consequences of a refusal to take the breath test,
that the test would not be valid unless motorist
removed his chewing gum from his mouth, and
that refusal to remove the gum would be considered a refusal to submit to the test, motorist's refusal to remove the gum after agreeing
to take the test constituted a knowing and voluntary refusal to submit to the test since motorist refused to do that which was necessary
for a valid test. Mathie v. Schwendiman, 656
P.2d 463 (Utah 1982).
Where driver was denied a breathalyzer test
after having failed to comply with repeated requests to submit to the test, and then later requested the test after being transported to jail,
the driver was deemed to have effectively refused to take the test, and therefore the resultant suspension of his driver's license was
proper. Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736
(Utah 1984).
Where an officer spent approximately 30
minutes attempting to persuade plaintiff to
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submit to a test, but plaintiff steadfastly refused, and plaintiff's "request" for a test did not
come until some 15 to 20 minutes after his
final refusal and after the intoxilyzer machine
had been shut down, plaintiff's request for a
test did not vitiate his refusal. Baker v.
Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986).
A refusal simply means that an arrestee who
is asked to take a breath test declines to do so
of his own volition. Whether or not that refusal
is conditional or reasonable makes no difference. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778
(Utah 1986).
A refusal to answer yes or no to a request to
take a breath test is still a refusal. Lopez v.
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986).
Plaintiff was clearly informed of the consequences of her failure to submit to the blood
alcohol content test under this section and her
continued crying throughout the officer's requests and warnings that unless she responded, he would consider that she had refused and that her license could be revoked
constituted a voluntary refusal to submit. Lee
v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766 (Utah 1986).

Required submission

to test.

-Self-incrimination.
The requirement that a defendant, after his
arrest, submit to a breathalyzer test under the
threat of losing his driver's license, does not
deny him his constitutional protection from
self-incrimination, since the evidence yielded
by such testing is not of a testimonial or communicative nature. American Fork City v.
Crossgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985).
Failure of the officer at the time of arrest to
read the motorist his Miranda rights did not
invalidate the revocation of his license for failure to take the breathalyzer test, nor was his
refusal to take the test rendered inadmissible
in the revocation proceeding. Larson v.
Schwendiman, 712 P.2d 244 (Utah 1985).
A refusal to take a breathalyzer test is not
an act compelled by the state and is thus not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination provided in the Utah constitution.
Moreover, evidence of the refusal to take the
test is admissible in evidence and does not offend the privilege against self-incrimination or
the right to due process. Sandy City v. Larson,
733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987).
Right to refuse test.
By implying consent, this section removes
the right of a driver to lawfully refuse a test
but cannot remove his physical power to refuse. Thus, the purpose of the law is to avoid
the violence which often attends attempts to
forcibly test recalcitrant drivers. In re RLI, 739
P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Stay of license suspension.
Absent a strong showing of the likelihood of

success on the merits, the balancing of the factors to be considered in assessing an application for a stay of a driver's license suspension
under this section tips in favor of denying a
stay due to important public policy implications. Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Sworn report of arresting officer.
Where arresting officer's report concerning
driver's refusal to submit to a chemical test for
the presence of alcohol or drugs in the body
was not signed in the presence of a notary, the
report was not a sworn report as required by
this section and the ensuing revocation of the
driver's license was a legal nullity. Helsten v.
Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509 (Utah 1983).
Driver's license revocation proceeding for
failure of licensee to submit to breathalyzer
test was declared a legal nullity where police
officer did not verbally affirm or swear to the
contents of the report, although he did sign it
in the presence of a notary. Colman v.
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984).
Where an officer admitted at trial that a deputy county clerk did not formally put him under oath, but he testified that he went before
her, raised his right hand, and swore to the
accuracy of the report, in so doing, the officer
affirmatively
took an oath. Baker v.
Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986).
Where a deputy county clerk signed and
dated officer's report and affixed the seal of the
county clerk, acting in her capacity as deputy
court clerk, this was all that was required.
Baker v. Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah
1986).

Trial de novo in district court.
The trial de novo in the district court to review an administrative revocation of a driver's
license for refusal to submit to a blood test for
alcohol content pursuant to the implied consent statute is a complete retrial upon new evidence with the burden of proof and the burden
of going forward with the evidence upon the
drivers license division. Pledger v. Cox, 626
P.2d 415 (Utah 1981).
Warrantless search allowed.
Implied
consent
justifies
warrantless
searches under the following circumstances: (1)
there is probable cause to believe the suspect
was driving or in control of a motor vehicle
while having a statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content; (2) the suspect was arrested; and
(3) the method of extraction of blood was reasonable. In re RLI, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Cited in Moore v. Schwendiman, 76 Utah
Adv. Rep. 10 (Ct. App. 2/17/88); Layton City v.
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake
City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1987).
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41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in motor vehicle prohibited - Definitions
- Exceptions.
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any highway.
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the
contents of the container partially consumed.
(3) In this section:
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-l-5.
(b) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally
occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to
them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the
vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehicle.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters
of a motor home or camper.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed
taxicab or bus.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.20, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 272, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 55; 1987,
ch. 138, § 42.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 92, corrected the statutory
reference in Subsection (3)(b).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, in
Subsection (1) substituted "operating'' for
"driving" and deleted "street or" preceding
"highway"; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted
"32A-1-5"for "32-1-3"; in Subsection (3)(b) sub-

stituted "operator" for "driver" both places it
appears; in Subsection (4) deleted from the end
"but the driver of the vehicle will be prohibited
from consuming alcoholic beverages as provided in Subsection (1)"; deleted former Subsection (6), which read "Any person convicted
of a violation of this section is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor"; and made changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
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Research and General

Cross-References. Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 311.
A.L.R. - Validity of statute or ordinance

41-6-44.30.

making it an offense to consume or have alcoholic beverages in open package in motor vehicle, 57 A.L.R.3d 1071.

Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace
officers - Impound requirements - Removal of
vehicle by owner.

The Legislature finds that under this section it is contrary to the safety of
the public to leave vehicles unattended on highways.
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44:10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
41-6-44, which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall seize
and impound the vehicle, except as provided under Subsection (2).
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is
present at the time of arrest, the officer may release the vehicle to that
registered owner, but only if the registered owner:
(a) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene;
(b) presents to the officer a valid operator's license and sufficient
identification to prove ownership of the vehicle;
(c) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and
(d) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
41-6-44, which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to
operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is legally operable.
(3) An officer who impounds a vehicle under this section shall remove,
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible impound yard
that meets the standards set by rule by the Motor Vehicle Division, or if
none, to a garage or some other reasonably safe place. The impound yard
standards set by the Motor Vehicle Division shall be equitable and reasonable, and unrestrictive as to number of impound yards per geographical area. The peace officer or agency by whom the officer is employed
shall, within 24 hours after the seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division
of the seizure and impoundment. The notice shall state the operator's
name, a description of the vehicle, its identification number, if any, its
license number, the date, time, and place of impoundment, the reason for
impoundment, and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is
stored.
(4) Upon receipt of notice, the Motor Vehicle Division shall give notice
to the registered owner of the vehicle in the manner prescribed by Section
41-1-16. The notice shall:
(a) state the date, time, and place of impoundment, the name of the
person operating the vehicle at the time of seizure, the reason for
seizure and impoundment, and the name of the garage or place where
the vehicle is stored;
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(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of
towing, impound, and storage fees charged against the vehicle; and
(c) inform the registered owner of the vehicle of the conditions
under Subsection (5) which shall be satisfied before the vehicle is
released.
(5) The impounded vehicle shall be released after the registered owner
or the owner's agent: (a) makes a claim in person for release of the vehicle
at any office of the State Tax Commission; (b) pays an impound fee of$25;
(c) presents identification sufficient to prove ownership of the impounded
vehicle; and (d) pays all towing and storage fees to the impound lot where
the vehicle is stored. All impound fees assessed under this subsection are
dedicated revenue to the Motor Vehicle Division.
(6} An impounded vehicle not claimed by the registered owner or the
owner's agent within the time prescribed by Section 41-1-117 shall be sold
in acco:rdance with that section and the proceeds, if any, disposed of under
Sec,tion 41.1-117. The date ofimpoundment is considered the date of seizure for computing the time period provided in Section 41-l-117.
(7) Towing and storage fees shall be established by the Motor Vehicle
Division and shall be reviewed by the division annually to ensure equity
for vehicle owners and towing and storage operators. Towing, impound, or
storage fees are a lien on the vehicle.
(8) The registered owner of the vehicle upon the payment of all fees and
charges incurred in the seizure and impoundment of the owner's vehicle
has a. cause of action for all the fees and charges., together with damages,
court costs, and attorney fees, against the operator of the vehicle whose
actions caused the impou1,1dment.
(9} No liability may be imposed upon any peace officer, the state, or
any, of its political subdivisions on account of the enforcement of this
section.
History: C, 1953, 41-6-44.30, enacted by L.
1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 194,
§ l; 1984, ch. 37, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 43.
Amendment Notes. - The 1984 amendment deleted 41-&-43 and 41-&-44.2 f:rom sections listed in S1,1bsection(1); inserted "or a lo-.
cal ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44, which
complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1)" in Subsection (l); added "except as provided under
Subsection (2)." to Subsection (1); inserted Subsection (2) <1ndredesjgnated the following s,ubsections; substituted references tq Division of
Motor Vehicles for references to department of
motor vehicles throughout the section; substituted "within 24 hours" for "not later than

three days" in the third sentence of Subsection
(3); substituted "notify" for "cause notice of the
seizure and impoundment to be mailed" in the
third sentence of Subsection (3); and made
minor changes in phra.seology and style.
The 1987 amendment substituted "operator"
for "driver" throughout the section; in th~ in.tr-oductory paragraph substituted "highways"
for "public roads";· in S1,1bsection (1) deleted
"category I" preceding "peace officer"; and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation tkroughout the section..
Effective Dates. - Section 2 of Laws 1984,
ch. 37 provided: "This act shall take effect on
July 1, 1984."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1983,. 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 175.
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Reckless

driving -

Penalty.

(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a
second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943,
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178,
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment rewrote Subsection (2).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, substituted "A person who operates" for "Any person who drives" in Subsection (1) and made
minor changes in phraseology in the second
and third sentences of Subsection (2).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 204, made

minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References.
- Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing
for felonies,
§§ 76-3-201,
76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-30L

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65

Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925), reviewed, State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157
P.2d 258 (1945).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312 et seq.
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 609
to 624.
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and application of criminal statutes specifically directed
against racing of automobiles on public streets
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286.

Liability of one fleeing police for injury resulting from collision of police vehicle with another vehicle, person, or object, 51 A.L.R.3d
1226.
Statute prohibiting reckless driving: definiteness and certainty, 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 330.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46.

Speed regulationsSafe and appropriate speeds
at certain locations - Prima facie speed limits Emergency power of the governor.

(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, including, but not limited to when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
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